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This thesis seeks to use probability models to investigate the effects and value of
battle damage assessment (BDA) information availability on sequential tasks encountered
in the defense against missile attacks. Different levels of information will have different
impacts on the outcome of the battle. Additional information could increase the
effectiveness of the defensive weapon system. On the other hand, the enemy could use
deception techniques, electronic warfare (EW) and Decoy measures on the information-
gathering methods to disrupt the acquisition of information which would decrease the
effectiveness of defensive weapons. In the models, we show how to best allocate limited
resources; i.e. the available kill time, to maximize the reward. We define a measure of
effectiveness (MOE) for information which can be used for evaluating information value
and decision making. We discuss different strategic alternatives and information value for
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In recent years, many countries have acquired short range ballistic missiles. As a
result, many other countries have become possible targets for these missiles. Even when
these missiles carry conventional warheads they levy a psychological and political penalty
on the defending nation. Naturally, the defending nations are seeking effective ways to
repulse ballistic missile attacks.
Defense, for most of the nations who believe they may be subject to a ballistic
missile attack, is in the terminal stage of the ballistic missile trajectory; that is, when the
missile reenters the atmosphere in a path towards its intended target. This thesis explores
probability models to investigate the effects and value of information available to perform
sequential tasks in the defense against a ballistic missile attack.
The information available for these sequential tasks encountered in a ballistic
missile defense is termed battle damage assessment (BDA). This thesis investigates
different levels of information for the battle damage assessment and the varying impacts
this will have on the outcome of the battle. It is assumed that additional information could
increase the effectiveness of the defense's weapons systems. Scenarios are explored where
the enemy uses electronic warfare and decoys to disrupt the defender's acquisition of
information. The intent of these models is to produce results for allocating limited
resources and maximizing the available kill time and the probability of destroying a real
missile rather than an electronic image or a decoy. The models are discussed from both the
view point of the defender and the attacker.
First, the author presents a generic scenario which will be used throughout the rest
of the study to analyze probabilities for both defender and attacker. Each scenario is
further categorized by an investigation with battle damage assessment information and a
scenario in which there is no battle damage information. Next, a measure of effectiveness
is developed for the investigation. Finally, the author presents an investigation of the effect
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of countermeasures on all the scenarios developed earlier in the study and a more detailed
presentation of the effects of electronic warfare on the defensive systems.
The implication of the study are that theater missile defense would require
enormous investments in research and the resources of the defending country If the
defender pursues a theater missile defense it must be done very carefully When a
successful attack takes place, even the crudest of ballistic missile might have a
psychological effect out of proportion to the military value of the weapon. For example, in
the Gulf War, the allies expended enormous resources to destroy missiles which when
launched, rarely found a target and in any case, were not aimed at any militarily valuable
target These weapons had political effects well beyond their real military value.
Throughout the study, it is apparent that theater ballistic missile defense is closely
tied to the battle damage assessment information system. Without the development of
these systems it will be impossible for the defender to allocate the resources of kill time
and weapons to achieve the best outcome for the battle.
The effect of electronic warfare and different levels of deception on the battle
damage assessment information can have important effects and should be carefully
investigated to ensure that the defender receives the benefit of more information. An
improved kill rate on the first target in the scenarios presented, increases the value of
battle damage assessment.
Suggested follow-on research is the problem of target identification to determine
whether the target is a missile or a decoy With reliable target identification information,
the problems presented in this thesis would be reduced to improvements in weapons
efficiency, and the scenarios themselves would consist of which target to identify first
rather than which target is the most probable warhead
This thesis presents a very simple scenario However, the probability models
identify some real world problems The author found that the information provided by a
battle damage assessment greatly affects the effectiveness of any defense scenario.
Sometimes this effect is unexpected, and this subject should be rigorously studied before





Technological advances have made it possible for many countries to acquire
ballistic missiles. As a result of the advances in technology and the willingness of some
countries to sell that technology, the likelihood of ballistic missile attack is increasing
Ballistic missiles can deliver conventional and unconventional weapons over extended
ranges. Even when a ballistic missile carries a conventional warhead it can still cause
significant damage to the capability of the defender. From the experience of The Gulf War,
we know that ballistic missile attacks can cause problems not only to the infrastructure and
to human lives but can also create psychological and political problems in that a nation
lives in constant fear of attack. The nation's economy will suffer and the nation's internal
cohesiveness may decrease.
Many countries are seeking an effective way to defend themselves against ballistic
missile attacks. For example, the United States started the Ballistic Missile Defense
Program (BMD) in April 1984 [Ref. 1], The current BMD program contains three major
parts:
1. Theater Missile Defense
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program is intended to provide highly effective
TMDs to forward deployed forces and to U.S. Forces and allies. The TMD defense can
take many forms. The Joint Chief of Staff categorizes TMD mission needs as, first, a
passive defense to enhance the survivability of friendly forces and assets; second, a battle
Management/Command, Control and Communications and Intelligence system (BM/C3I)
to provide effective communications, command and control of the TMD operation and to
ensure data flow; third, an attack operations ( Counter-force) for the destruction of the
enemy's capability to launch missiles; and finally an active defense to intercept the Theater
Ballistic Missile (TBM) in flight so as to eitheT destroy the TBM or negate the effects of
the warhead.
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2. U. S. National Missile Defense
National Missile Defense is a research and development project for the
development of ground based-defenses to protect the U.S. from a limited ballistic missile
attack The Army's National Missile Defense (NMD) system will operate with external
Early Warning (EW) sensors (Space and Missile Tracking System, DSP and EWR) and
the United States Space Command's (USSPACECOM) Command and Control Center via
a Command-Level Battle Management Command Control and Communications (BMC3)
network The Army configuration of the proposed NMD system includes ground-based
exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors, a ground-based phased array and national defense
radar (for surveillance, tracking, object classification and kill assessment) and Battalion
BMC3 (Bn BMC3) (for human-in-control, engagement planning, top level decision
making and system communications) [Ref 2].
3. Follow-On Research
Follow-on research supports more advanced BMD technologies. For example, to
increase the effectiveness of the weapon system, issues related to the flow and utilization
of information play an important role in the BMD program. The BMD program represents
an investment of $34,683.3 million dollars [Ref. 1]. These resources can be used to
improve the effectiveness of weapon systems or improve the acquisition flow and
utilization of information However, how do we evaluate the value of information9 What
are the trade-offs of investing money on weapon or information9 How can we effectively
use information to get the best results?
B. ACTIVE DEFENSE
Considering the trajectory of a ballistic missile, the active defense can be divided
into three opportunity stages:
1. The Boost Stage
The boost stage is the early portion of missile flight. In this stage the missile
engine will burn to produce thrust until it reaches terminal velocity. There are advantages
to engaging in this phase The first is that the missile is in its early flight and cannot expel
its multiple warheads and decoys. The second is that the missile is probably still above the
attackers' territory and will not cause any damage to the defender
Because of short time and longer distances represented by this stage, the stage
requires a relatively higher technology to intercept a missile We may use space-based
sensors and weapons ("Brilliant Eyes/Pebbles") to accomplish the task For the reason of
defense budget resources, this method would probably not be used in the post Cold-War
world
2. The Midcourse Stage
In this stage the missile follows a ballistic path. It is desirable to intercept in this
stage because of the advantage of destroying the missile outside the defender territory or
at very high altitude. At this stage it is less difficult to detect a target and to guide an anti-
ballistic missile weapon than in the boost stage. Additionally, the missile is moving
relatively slower than in the terminal stage. However, the enemy may use decoys or other
countermeasures to make the defenders' task more difficult.
3. The Terminal Stage
In this stage the missile re-enters the atmosphere and follows a downward path to
its target area. The defender at this stage has more resources to destroy the missile. For
example, the use of air-defense missiles and aircraft. The problem at this stage is that the
missile is moving at a very high speed and offers only a small window for interception.
Additionally, destruction of the missile will result in scattering debris that may still result in
the missile being an effective political weapon even though a less then effective military
one.
4. Summary
The stages of the ballistic missile trajectory can be thought of as three unique
opportunities or time windows for the defense to engage the missile attack.
C. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
Information is power in modern warfare and modern business. An effective system
must combine information technology with other resources to achieve the best results The
Ballistic Missile Defense needs an extremely accurate and fast strike capability which can
only be accomplished with a high speed command, control, communication, intelligence
(C3I) and battle awareness information system. Information can be obtained from external
sources, such as satellites, early-warning air radar, ground-based radar and other sensor
systems. The system may produce information on target identification, detection,
tracking, and project battle damage. Different levels of information will have different
impacts on the outcome of the battle. Additional information could increase the
effectiveness of the defensive weapon system. On the other hand, the enemy could use
deception techniques on the information-gathering (EW and Decoy measures) methods to
disrupt the acquisition of information which would decrease the effectiveness of defensive
weapons.
This thesis seeks to use probability models to investigate the effects and value of
information availability on sequential tasks encountered in defense against missile attacks.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. THE GENERIC SCENARIO
This thesis is mainly based on study of a generic scenario and the assumptions in
the following paragraphs. These assumptions restrict the problem to two tasks and the
decision as to which task to pursue to obtain maximum combat effectiveness. The tasks
are performed by a weapon system (server). The weapon system (server) contains a
sensor-C3 sub-system and a ballistic missile interceptor It is confronted with the
opportunity to address particular and temporarily available tasks; that is to destroy
incoming targets. Each task requires an acquisition time Ta to acquire enough detection
and identification information for an incoming missile. While the tracking information is
available the interceptor can start to deliver a lethal kill. After a lethal kill time Tk the
target will be destroyed.
Because of the ballistic missile trajectory there is only a limited period of time
(window) to engage target /', i.e. accomplish Task /'. Let's assume that the server starts to
work on Task 1 from time tn = and the time available to complete Task 1 extends to tn
> tn- The opportunity to work on Task 2 begins at t 2 i, where t 2 i > 0, resulting in an
overlapped region between the two tasks of t^ - t2i. (See Figure 2-1); the opportunity to
lask 1
Task 2
Figure 2-1. Overlapping Tasks
work on Task 2 ends at time t22.
More than two tasks could be overlapping in a real world problem, but for the
purposes of this study only two tasks will be considered Assume that at any moment the
time needed to complete service on Task / is T* = Ta + Tk For a glimpse-type sensor the
acquisition time Ta will be modeled as an exponential random variable which has mean
MA a . Depending on the characteristics of the weapon, we may choose different
distributions for the lethal kill time Tk For convenience, we assume that the time to
complete task / has an exponential distribution with mean 1/ X,. Since MX, is the expected
survival time of target /, the parameter X, can be thought of as the relative efficiency
factor of an anti-ballistic missile weapon. A weapon with a higher X, is a more efficient
weapon, because within a limited time interval the chance to complete a task is higher.
Assume that at any moment in time there is a chance to kill a target that is
independent of events that have preceeded that point (t, t + dt) in time (= X, dt, where dt is
a small time, although the completion rate X, could depend on time and distance: X,(t ,d)
We will allow the server, shooter, or sensor to "attack" just one task at a time. However,
under some conditions one could co-allocate "shots" across several tasks or targets. A
BMD system will assign different values to different targets. If we finish a task, we will be
rewarded with the task's value. On the other hand if we do not finish then the task will not
have any value The task value relates to the damage the missile might cause to the
defender in case it is not intercepted.
The issue of primary interest in this paper is how to best allocate limited server
capacity to the two tasks in the light of the available information. Ultimately, this will
determine how much effort to expend for an increase in opportunity time This will also
lower service (reaction/response/kill) times of the server and reduce the effect of target
duping and other attacker tactics.
The following discussion of models reflects varying levels of information that
might be available to the defender or server. It is assumed that the server has knowledge
of the various times t:i, 1 12, t:2, sufficiently in advance to allow the server to accommodate
the decision making process.
B. MODEL WITH PERFECT ACQUISITION INFORMATION BUT
WITHOUT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA) INFORMATION
In this model we will assume that the BMD system has perfect target acquisition
information, including detection, identification, and localization information So there is no
acquisition time model required. The defense system knows when Task / is available but
does not know when it is or will be completed. Since there is no-BDA information the
system will use a threshold policy to engage a target. The rule of engagement is first-
come, first-served. The system starts immediately with Task 1 and pursues service of Task
1 for threshold time X\ 2 ( here t2i < I12 < tn)- Then the system switches to Task 2 after t !2
and continues to t22 Ifwe finish Task 1 we will have received the value for the first target,
Vi If the system completes Task 2 in time the result is value V2 . Assume the task values
are additive Realistically, in a real world situation, the values need not add; including the
defended target's value accounting for the effect of a second strike on the same target may
be smaller in terms of infrastructure or more in terms of personnel.
1. Expected Reward
We will assess the reward of a policy by the expected sum of the values of the two
tasks accomplished. Let V(r^) be the expected reward from following the above nde\ that
is, if the system switches targets between end of the available time for Task 1 , and the
beginning of the available time for Task 2:
V(Tu ) = v\\-e-^-] + V2 \\-e-
M,*- rn)
= K +V2 -\v^ tl2 +V2e~Xl{tr2
~
Tl2
cf. Gaver and Jacobs (1996) [Ref. 7].
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In fact, it is convenient to study the decrement to achieving the maximum reward






e-*'= "*>], tu <zn <tn
where 1 =Vi/(V* +V*)> r* = Vzlfo + F*)-
We want to pick Tn - ropt that minimizes this decrement. Now







This tells us that D(rr ) is bowl-shaped, having just one bottom as shown in Figure
2-2. One of the above pictures must describe the situation, which one depends on the
various parameters In case (I), the unrestricted minimum of D(rp ) occurs before /,,, the
time when Task 2 appears A change to Task 2 at this time cannot be sensible under the
current model because Task 2 is not available; the best feasible time must be at /:i for this
case If case (II) prevails, then there is a bona-fide time between /,, and tn to change to
Task 2 If case (III) holds, then it is best to continue with Task 1 to the end ("a bird in
hand .") and then switch over to Task 2 Note that only one switch is allowed
r12 (I) r12 (II) r12 (III)
hi hi
Figure 2-2. Bowl-Shaped
The above can be formalized by finding rn , the global/unrestricted minimizing
value of changeover time threshold by minimizing (finding bowl-bottom coordinate) of
D(tI2) Then
fop, = >21 if ^2 ^ >2
=
*;, if/ 21 <?; 2 </ 12





















Case (I) holds if r,
;
< t2V in which case r pt = t2V
Case (II) holds if/,, < T12 < tn; then ropt = x ]2 .
Case (III) holds if t )2 > f12 ; then ropt = f12;
cf. Gaver and Jacobs (1996) [Ref 7].
For Case (I) where t, 2 must be less then t2l in the solution to Equation 9 we have
/
h2
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then T12 will less than t 2 i, in which case the server will choose x opt = t 2 i.






, then r i 2 > tn , in which case z opl = ti 2 ,
X\
From Equation 9 we know that T opt is governed by In ( V1A1 / V2A 2 ). If V1A1 < V2A 2 then
In ( V1A.1 / V2A 2 ) is negative Notice that V,Ai < V2A 2 is equivalent to Vj /( 1/A.i) =
V,/E(T|) < V 2/E(T 2 ) = (Vi l\2 ) This means when the expected reward value gained from
killing Task 1 per unit time is less than Task 2, the system will allocate less kill time for
Task 1 in order to maximize the total expected reward value Under this situation the best
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strategy for the server to get more expected return value is to switch early to work on
Task 2. On the other hand if the expected return value per unit time of Task 1 is more
than Task 2, then the server should spend more time on Task 1 This property indicates
that a system will spend more time on a high value and high kill rate target, which is
intuitive.
For example, suppose two tasks arrive simultaneously and the available
engagement time is one unit for both tasks; the Task 2 has a fixed value 5; A.i and \2 each
vary from 0.05 to 5. Figures 2-3a to 2-3d show that if the Task 1 is more important
(higher value) than Task 2, then the system will assign relatively more value, i.e. larger T12
to Task 1 The model reflects the fact that the best strategy for the system to get more
return value is to spend more time on Task 1
.
In Figure 2-3a Task 1 value (Vi=l) is less than Task 2 value (V2=5). In order to
get more value the system will switch to Task 2 early. So the threshold (Opt_taul2) is less
than 0.5 in most cases. However, the right-inner part (area A) of the figure shows that if
Task2 is relatively much harder to complete (i.e. ^2 is very small) than Taskl, we had
better continue to work on the easier job instead of working on a job which we may not
finish. In Figure 2-3b (Vi=V2=5) for most of the cases we switch around 0.5 unit of time.
However, the left-inner part (area B) shows that if A,i is very small the strategy to get
more value is to switch early.
Figures 2-3c and 2-3d display results for a case in which Vi is much higher than
V2 . Most of the time the optimal ii 2 is above 0.5 unit time. Notice that in Figure 3d area D
is lower than it's vicinity. From Eq-9, we know that when X\ is relatively large then the
optimal T12 will decrease by the amount about proportional to 1/(A. \+X 2 ) This property
indicates that when the system is efficient enough for the first target, the system should
reserve some time for the second target.
Figure 2-4 displays results that when Task 2 value increases from 1 to 45 the
optimal threshold value decreases. Figure 4d shows that the value of Task 2 (V2= 45) is so
great that the system had better switch over to Task 2 as soon as possible
11





Figure 3c VI =15 V2=5
Lambdal Lambda2
Figure 3d VI =45 V2=5
Lambdal Lambda2 Lambda Lambda2
Figure 2-3. Optimal x i2 Increases As V ( Increases











Figure 4d V1=5 V2=45
Lambdal
5 5 Lambda2 Lambdal Lambda2
Figure 2-4. Optimal i\ 2 Decreases As V 2 Increases
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However, when X 2 increases to 5 the weapon efficiency for Task 2 become high enough so
that the system will reserve some kill time for Task 1
C. MODEL WITH PERFECT BDA INFORMATION
In this model, we assume that we have damage assessment information from a
friendly source The damage assessment information is knowledge that the target is killed
when it is killed, that is knowledge that the task is completed when it is completed. The
task values are the same as in the previous model. However, the rule of engagement is
slightly different: the system starts immediately with Task 1 and pursues it for a (random)
time min(Ti, T12); Ti is the time to completion (acknowledgment of BDA) of Task 1 and
T12 is a threshold value. After the time, minimum (Ti, Xn), the system switches to Task 2.
We derive the expected return as follows:
By conditioning on T, = /, [Ref 3], the conditional expected return is
= V
i
+V2(\-e-^- tl) ), / 2,</,<r12 </ ]2 (11)
= V
2
(\-e^— ] ), / 21 <r12 <V
Now remove the condition:
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cf Gaver and Jacobs (1996) [Ref. 7],
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If x, = /L
2
= A, then (12) becomes
V(TX2 ) = Vl (l-e-
Xr
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= (1 + c)X for c > -1 and X2 = X. Since the times to complete the tasks
have independent exponential distributions, the lack of memory property suggests that we
may assume t
21
= to find the maximizing r12 . Rewriting (12), for < r12 < tn
\- e-y*
\-e-**
f[Tl2 ) = rl(\-e-^)+v7
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Thus, (12) with t2] > 0, A x = M 1 + c), and A2 = A, the maximizing r12 is
(28)
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cf. Gaver and Jacobs (1996) [Ref. 7].





c>-\, note that with no-BDA information, the switching time z s rl2
>
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with tu = r,°, only if c = 0. Thus the maximum amount of time to be devoted to Task I
after tn is smaller if the decision maker has no-BDA information than if he has perfect
BDA information. The following graphs Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 use the same
parameters as Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4. The results display the property that no matter
how the parameters change that the optimal threshold ii 2 for BDA system tends to be
greater than or equal the optimal threshold Xn tor no-BDA system
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Figure 2-5. The Optimal xi2 for BDA System Is Greater ( V, increases)
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Figure 6a V1=5 V2=1
Lambdal Lambda2 Lambdal
D 5 Lambda2
F i g u re 6 c V1 =5 V2= 15 Figure 6d V1 =5 V2=45
Lambdal Lambda2 Lambdal
Figure 2-6. The Optimal in for BDA System Is Greater ( V; increases)
D. THE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) FOR BDA INFORMATION
Selection of a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is perhaps the most important part
of any analysis. One of our main objectives is to find a quantitative way to evaluate the
value of information We need a MOE for information that is measurable, quantifiable and
measures to what degree the (real) objective is achieved [Ref. 4] We may choose the time
needed to finish a task or the value of the killed targets we achieved In this paper we
select the MOE of information to be the relative fractional improvement in expected return
value from the no information case. We define the information gain to be
Gain = ( Max (Vp) - Max (Vw) ) / Max(V//)
,
where \p is the expected return value with BDA information, V// is the expected return




It is important to determine where BDA information gives us the greatest reward
We also need to find the sensitive parameters A good MOE should be able to characterize
the situation under study. We recognize that the MOE is a function of several variables V\,
V2, Ai, A : , and the overlap of available kill time windows We need to know which
variable is the most important, and over what ranges the variables should be studied
The most desirable and direct way to study the relationship between the
parameters of the MOE function is to use an analytic formula to find out how the MOE
function responds to each factor Note that the size of an overlapped kill time window is
just a relative size with respect to the weapon's kill rate So we may set a constant
overlapped window length to one unit time interval. Thus, we can simplify our problem to
four parameters: \\, X 2 , V\ and V\.
We can use the formula Gain = (Vp(xp*) - V>/(t„*) )/ V/?(t„*) to do three-
dimensional plots. The optimal expected reward for BDA information Vp(zp*) is obtained
by substituting the optimal threshold xp * into Equation 12. The optimal expected reward
for no-BDA information Vn(t„*) is obtained by substituting the optimal threshold in*
into Equation 1
.
A three-dimensional response surface plot [Ref. 5] can numerically characterize the
MOE function with respect to two factors. We choose weapon kill rates X x and X 2 as the
variables so that we can understand how the BDA information gain varies with respect to
the weapon efficiency. We may also want to know how the MOE function changes with
respect to the change of assigned task value.
The results displayed in Figure 2-7 use the same parameters as before except for
the task value Vi=10 and V2=5. It shows that the gain from the BDA information is
relatively useful for a certain range of parameters. Note that in the region A the weapon
efficiency for Task 1 (kx) is small (near zero) and the gain from BDA information is also
small. Since it is difficult to destroy the first target, the BDA is not useful which is
intuitive. In the graph region B, the BDA information gain is higher than in region A.
Since X\ increases, we have a better chance to get to Task 2. However, in this region both
19

X\ and A,2 are relatively large and the chance to get both task values is high Hence, we are
indifferent gathering BDA information. Similar reasoning in region C suggests that if the
chance to get the value of Task 2 is small, both systems will work on Task 1 , thus we gain
little from BDA information In the region D, we can get the best benefit from BDA
information which gives us a Gain of about 20 percent
From the above analysis, we know that if we need to make a decision whether to
invest money to improve the weapon efficiency or to gather more information, we have to
think carefully whether we can really benefit from our investment
Figure 7 V1=10 V2=5
Lambdal
Figure 2-7. BDA Information Gain
Lambda2
The results displayed in Figures 2-8 and 2-9 use exactly the same parameters as
Figures 2-5 and 2-6. We notice that in Figure 2-8a the Gain in region A is higher than that
the other regions; in this region the value ofk2 \s near zero and V, is relatively small. The
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expected total task value that the systems gets is a small value too Thus an improvement
from BDA information will be significant
Figure 2-8d displays results for a system that assigns a very high value for Task 1
The information Gain value is below 1 all over the whole region Since both systems
allocate most of it's kill time on Task I, it makes little difference to have BDA information
or not to have BDA information.
Figures 2-8 and 2-9 also show that the MOE function is sensitive to the change of
parameters. A proper MOE function should be able to reflect the change of the objective
function value with respect to the change of parameters We find that our MOE function is




Figure 8a VI = 1 V2=5 Figure 8b VI =5 V2=5
Lambdal Lambda2
Figure 8c V1 =15 V2=5
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Lambdal Lambda2
Figure 8 d V1=45V2=5
Lambda Lambda2 Lambdal J Lambda2
Figure 2-8. BDA Information Gain (V t Increases)
Figure 9a V1=5 V2=1 Figure 9b V1=5 V2=5
5 5Lambdal Lambda2
Figure 9c V1=5 V2=15
Lambdal 5 5 Lambda2






Figure 2-9. BDA Information Gain (V2 Increases)
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III. THE VALUE OF BDA INFORMATION IN ELECTRONIC WARFARE
A. THE BACKGROUND
In military operations, it has become increasingly important to use electronic
countermeasures (ECM) and decoys to mislead an enemy's interpretation of radar
information. By using electronic jamming techniques the attacking side can imitate radar
signals and present false targets and information Moreover, the enemy can mix real
targets with decoys; these when combined with jamming techniques, can greatly increase
his probability of success.
In the previous models, we have discovered that if a system pursues an optimal
threshold policy to maximize expected reward, it should allocate the precious resource
(kill time) to a target that has relatively high value and high kill rate. It is reasonable to
assume that the attacker is willing to use ECM and decoys to dupe the defender into
thinking a decoy is the more valuable target. If the attacker succeeds, the defender will
spend less time on the real target.
The optimal strategy for an attacker is to dupe the defender into working on
decoys over the entire overlapped "window." We assume the attacker has two choices:
either to launch the decoy first, followed by the real missile; or to launch the missile first,
followed by the decoy. Depending on the sequence chosen the battle outcomes will be
different. If the attacker chooses to launch the decoy first, he is hoping to dupe the
defender into putting off the switching over time for the real missile until the end of the
overlapped window. If the attacker chooses to launch the missile first, he is hoping that
the defender will choose to switch to the decoy as soon as possible.
We assume that decoy and missile are detected simultaneously, the available kill
time window for both targets are completely overlapped. Thus, the overlapped window is
defined as w = t x2 = t 22 (See Figure 2-1). We also assume that the defender is unaware of
being duped. Proceeding with the following analysis as in the previous models, if the
decoy is launched first, we assume that the decoy is the first target presented to the
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defender If the decoy is launched second, then the second target presented to the
defender is the decoy By BDA information is meant the information that the first target
has been killed when it is killed
B. MODELS FOR DEFENDER UNAWARE OF BEING DUPED
1. Case I : The Attacker's Decoy is First, Followed by the Missile
The decoy and missile have fixed rates of being killed of A.a and km respectively.
The missile has a fixed value of Vm . Since the defender has been duped, he will be duped
into assigning a duped value Vd to the decoy and choosing an optimal threshold time Xdm
to switch tasks. Because the actual reward value of the decoy is zero, the more value that
the defender assigns to the decoy the more successful will be the attacker's ECM
operation.
By varying the decoy's duped value Vd', we can compare systems with and
without BDA information to see how they work under different levels ofECM operation.
The actual expected reward value of a system without BDA information can be obtained
by rewriting Equation 1 with Vd = 0, t22 = ve. The actual expected value the defender gets
is:
r.(*<.) = v j -M"-'- (31)
where Xjm is the duped optimal threshold for the no-BDA information system.
If the defender has BDA information, from Equation 12 setting Vd = 0, t« = tn = w , and
t2i= 1 1 1= 0, the actual expected value the defender gets is:
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where Tdm is the duped threshold for the BDA information system
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15 20
Figure 3-1 System Duped to Think Decoy is More Valuable
The x axis is the decoy's duped value which is assigned by the defender We vary
the duped value Vj from 1 to 20 to represent different levels that the defender has been
duped The y axis is a combined scale which includes the duped optimal x ( /„, ( from to 1 )
and the actual expected reward value with both BDA and no-BDA information system.
In Figure 3-1, we find that when Vd is less than 4, the actual expected return value
of a system with BDA information is less than that a system without BDA information.
There are two reasons why BDA information may not be advantageous: First,
from the previous model we know that a system with BDA information tends to make its
changeover threshold higher than a system without BDA information This property
causes a system which has BDA information to waste more time on the decoy Second,
the decoy is not likely to be destroyed within a short time interval, so the BDA
information will not be helpful
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The no-BDA information system has shortcomings when the system is duped into
thinking that a decoy is more important than a missile A system with no-BDA
information, may set its threshold towards the end of the window, resulting in the no-BDA
system returning no reward value since the system has spent all its time on a decoy
For a system with BDA information, even though it is duped into thinking a decoy
is a missile it can still receive some reward value Vm from the real target since it uses min
(Tj, r^) strategy If the decoy is destroyed, the system will immediately start to work on
the real target The worst case for the system with BDA information is to set its threshold






From Equation 33 we know that the larger Xd is, the easier it is to kill the decoy
and the more expected return value a system with BDA information will receive. Figure 3-
2 displays results for the same parameters as in Figure 3-1 except that the kill rate for the
decoy is Xd = 4. It shows the actual expected reward (Vp=2.6) is higher than that of
previous example (Vp=2).
From the above analysis the models give some insights into the value of BDA
information in an ECM environment. The attacker should make the defender think that the
decoy is very valuable and easily destroyed. The attacker should create a decoy that take a
maximum time to destroy. For the defender who has BDA information, the information






















System is duped into thinking decoy is more valuable
i BDA ;












: * 4-' %
No BDA TauJ
10
first target value Vd
15 20
Figure 3-2 System Duped to Think Decoy is More Valuable X<\ = 4
2. Case II : The Attacker's Missile Is First, Followed By The Decoy
The attacker launches the real missile first then launches the decoy. The missile and
decoy have fixed rates of being killed of A,m = 1 and Xd = 2 respectively. The missile has a
fixed value Vm = 5 . If the defender is duped into thinking that the second target decoy is a
missile, the system with BDA information will have a higher actual return value. Both




. However, the duped optimal xmd value for a BDA information is higher
than that of a no-BDA information system So the actual expected reward for a system
with BDA information is higher than that for a system without BDA information. If both
systems are duped into thinking that a decoy is high value target, then both will receive no
value, since they both will set the duped optimal threshold imi to zero Figure 3- shows
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both the BDA and the no-BDA system receive zero value when duped into thinking a
decoy is the most important target.
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Figure 3-3. BDA and No-BDA System Receive Zero Value
3. Case III Countermeasure by Maxmin Expected Reward Criteria
Assume that the defender does not have enough information to correctly
differentiate between a decoy and a missile. However, the defender knows that the
attacker may take advantage by using a decoy. The defender must make a decision to
choose an optimal threshold x which will not be affected greatly by the enemy's ECM
efforts. We assume that a conservative defender will use a "maxmin criteria ." This means
the defender will choose a threshold among all possible thresholds with the "best" of the
worst outcome values.
Assume there is only one missile and one decoy and that they appear
simultaneously Assume their available kill time windows are completely overlapped First,
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consider a system without BDA information It will choose a threshold T to engage the
first target. It will receive a reward value by destroying the real target If the system
engages the missile first, the kill time allocated to the missile will be t The expected
reward value in this case will be:
Vnl(T)=Vm [l- €-*-'] (34)
If the system engages the decoy first, then the kill time allocated to the missile will be the
remaining time (w-r) The expected reward value will be:
Vm{x) = V 1 ("-0 (35)
If the no-BDA information defender uses a "maxmin criteria," then his optimal expected
reward value will be VB(x* ) = Max ( Min ( V„i( x) ) , Min ( V
r
n2 { t) ) ),
where the minimum is taken over all switching times.







The optimal expected reward value for BDA system will be:
Vb(i* ) = Max ( Min ( Vhx { x)
)
, Min ( Vb2( x)
)
). (38)
In Figure 3-4 we use the same parameters X^ = L2 =1 ,Vm = 5, Vd = 0, w = 1 In
Figures 3-4b to 3-4d situations the BDA information system has a decoy kill rate (Xd = LI)
equal to 5, 3 and 0.2 unit respectively. The Figures display results that a system with BDA
information using the maxmin criteria will tend to set its threshold greater than half of the
available kill window provided the kill rate of a decoy is high. In this manner the BDA
system can also get more expected value than a system without BDA information. From





This means when the BDA information system uses the maxmin criteria it is at least as
good as the no-BDA information system( Figure 3 -4a)
















































Figure 3-4 System With BDA Information Using Maxmin Criteria
4. Case IV Countermeasure by Hard Kill
The proceeding discussion of enemy's electronic countermeasure invokes one of
the most important problems of operations research It is possible for the defender to
devote time to gathering more identification information and to use that information to
ensure a "hard kill," i.e. to use his weapon to shoot down any available targets If
electronic support measures (ESM) for identifying targets are not available, the decision
maker must make a decision as whether to shoot both targets or only a single target.
It is important to provide a sensitivity analysis of different weapon efficiencies for
the decoy target The purpose of the analysis is to provide the decision maker with a basis
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for decision Thus the decision maker can make his decision based on his own weapon
efficiency
Assume that the defender believes his weapon can easily kill the enemy's decoy
The defender wishes to use his weapon to destroy any targets and reduce the possibility
that a missed target could deliver its warhead. Because identification information is not
available, the defender has to subjectively assign values to targets. If the defender believes
that the target is a decoy he will assign a low task value to that target. Let's assume that
the value or utility of destroying this decoy is 5. If the defender believes that the target
is a missile, he will assign a task value of 5 units For the discussion below, assume there
are two incoming targets, one is the real missile and the other a decoy.
The enemy's tactical alternative will be defined as a random event Xthat has states
of 0i and 02. Use 0i to represent the event that the enemy launches the decoy first then
the missile and 02 to represent the attacker's opposite launching sequence.
The defender's tactical decision for both BDA and no-BDA systems will be to
increase or decrease the threshold time to switch to Task 2. Since the no-BDA system will
pursue the optimal threshold policy, if the defender believes that the decoy comes first, by
assigning a low value to the first target the system will decrease the threshold time
automatically. We denote the decreased optimal time threshold to be Tdm *; this policy will
be denoted by di. If the defender believes that the missile comes first, by assigning a high
value to the first target the system will decrease the threshold time automatically. We
denote the decreased optimal threshold time to be xmd*; this policy will be denoted by d2
A similar threshold behavior can be applied to the BDA system. However, the decreased
threshold time decision (d\) for BDA information system will be determined by the min(Td
,
xdm * ), this policy increased threshold time decision (d2 ) will be determined by the min(Tm
The result of the defender's decision d, e D and attacker's actions 0, e X will
generate the payoff of R„. The payoff matrices for no-BDA and BDA information systems
31
are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. The payoff for both systems can be
calculated by using the equations appearing in Appendix A.
Figure 3-5 displays results for the attacker launch sequence: the decoy comes first
followed by the missile and the parameters Xm= 1 , Vm = 5, Vd = 0.5, t t2 = t 22 = 1, tn = t2 i =
We vary the decoy kill rate Xd from 0.1 to 15. When the kill rate for the decoy Xd is
above 5 units, the actual reward va,\ue(R2ibda) for the BDA information system which
misidentified the target sequence is nearly the same as the actual reward value(R//5^) if
the BDA system correctly identified the target. Since the defender believes that the missile
comes first and reserves more of the time for first target (decoy) the BDA information
system with a high decoy kill rate can ameliorate the effect of the misidentification.
However, the best case for no-BDA information can only achieve 1 unit actual expected




Use 9) (Decoy / Missile)
Sequence to Attack
Use 0: (Missile / Decoy)
Sequence to Attack
Use dj ( Decoy / Missile)
Sequence to Defend
Correctly Apply Threshold Incorrectly Apply Threshold
Tdm - Rl2
Use d: ( Missile / Decoy)
Sequence to Defend
Incorrectly Apply Threshold Correctly Apply Threshold
Table 1. Payoff Matrix for No-BDA System
Attacker's Action—*
Defender's Action!
Use 0i (Decoy / Missile)
Sequence to Attack
Use 0; (Missile / Decoy)
Sequence to Attack
Use dj ( Decoy / Missile)
Sequence to Defend
Correctly Apply Threshold
Min(T(] , Tin*) : R,,bda
Incorrectly Apply Threshold
Min(Tm . Tdm" ) : R,:Bda
Use d: ( Missile / Decoy)
Sequence to Defend
Incorrectly Apply Threshold
Min(T(1 . Tmi) ") : R2ibda
Correctly Apply Threshold Min
Min(Tm . Tmd ) : R22bda
Table 2. Payoff Matrix for BDA System
Figure 3-6 displays results for the attacker launch sequence: the missile
comes first followed by the decoy The parameters are the same as those of Figure 3-5.
We find that if the kill rate for the decoy A.d is above 10 units, the actual reward value
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(R-i25D,i) tor the BDA information system which has misidentified the target sequence is
about the same as the actual reward value (Rubda) if the system correctly identified the
sequence Since the defender believes that the decoy comes first and allocates less time for
first target (decoy) the BDA information system need a higher efficiency of X<i = 10 rather
than Xd = 5 to make up for the identification mistake However, the best case for no-BDA
information can only achieve 1 unit actual expected reward if it misidentifies the attack
sequence.
From the above analysis, we conclude that if a system has BDA information and a
high weapon efficiency, it is possible for the system to counter the decoy by killing both
targets. However, for a system with no-BDA information the chance to successfully
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Figure 3-6. Weapon Efficiency Sensitivity Analyses for Situation in Which
Missile Comes First
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON RESARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS
Recently the People's Republic of China has been using their M-9 medium-range,
mobile-launched ballistic missiles to intimidate my country, Taiwan, the Republic of China.
The M-9 ballistic missile which can carry a 1,100 lb. single warhead has been launched and
splashed barely 20 nautical miles away from Taiwan's main seaports, Keelung and
Kaohsiung. It is reported that bank depositors have withdrawn $370 million from the
Taiwan banks. The country's economic outlook has been greatly affected by the ballistic
missile attacks. Moreover, the political confrontation is not just between Taiwan and
mainland China but also involves the United States.
Again this is a demonstration that the threat from theater ballistic missiles is
growing. Such weapons can play a major political role in a regional conflict. The reasons
for a theater missile defense project are: (1) to protect allies and troops deployed overseas
in the theater conflicts; (2) to discourage global ballistic missile proliferation; (3) to reduce
the chance that an ally is politically affected by the threat of a missile attack. The United
States should devote more efforts to theater ballistic missile defense.
However, theater missile defense requires major investment. The proper evaluation
of weapon and information efficiency should be carefully studied. This thesis investigated
the effects and value of battle damage assessment information availability in the defense
against sequential missile attacks. It was found that both no-BDA and BDA information
systems may both allocate their scarce resources, i.e. the available kill time, to achieve the
best battle outcome, but that BDA can provide an advantage to the defender.
For the purpose of investigating, and to quantify the value of information, we
define a measure of effectiveness(MOE) for information. Without a proper MOE function
to provide quantitative insights into feasibility and critical physical factors, a proper
decision under uncertainty cannot be made. Developing a MOE function and applying it to
the question of allocation of scarce resources in the light of the available information is not
35
only for the purpose of information evaluation, it also serves the purpose of assisting in the
selection of a sound tactical strategy for decision making. The MOE function can provide
insight into how the various system parameters interact and how sensitive they are to
changes The MOE function demonstrates that the effect of information is measurable, and
quantifiable, and that a MOE can quantify the degree that the real objective is achieved. It
can also help in understanding the trade-offs between weapon efficiency and the value
information In conclusion, the MOE function can be used for BDA information
evaluation
In Chapter III, we compare the value of BDA information and no-BDA
information in certain situations involving electronic warfare (EW). Under different levels
of deception, the BDA and no-BDA information will result in different rewards A careful
design of a system must be made to really benefit from BDA information. In the design it
should be kept in mind that BDA is not a panacea. Depending on the enemy's strategies
the outcomes will be different with BDA or with no-BDA system. However, it is always
desirable to increase the first target kill rate to benefit from the BDA information.
B. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH
In modern warfare, information plays an important role. In this thesis, the
discussion is primarily about the value of BDA information However, in an EW
environment target identification information can play a key role. Bayesian decision
analysis could be applied to assist in the decision as to whether to develop assets to
acquire or to improve weapon efficiency If there is reliable target identification
information, a defender may be able to choose to only shoot the real target with high
probability and thus to save limited kill time and ammunitions This issue would involve
two kinds of conditional probability distribution. First, is the decision probability of
particular outcome x given a particular forecast/ Second, is the likelihood probability of
particular forecast / given a particular outcome x [Ref 6] The expected reward from
using identification information to shoot at only one target might be at least as good as
using a maxmin criteria, provided the likelihood probability specification is accurate and
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the data on the possible targets are adequate However, the defender can also change his
threshold to maximize the expected reward An appropriate model may be formulated as a
two-person zero sum game
In this thesis, it is assumed that the target acquisition time is zero However, in real
life, it is possible to spend significant time on such a task A problem will be how to best
allocate the acquisition and kill time How does a BDA and no-BDA information system
respond9
Finally, suppose there are M incoming missiles of N types with each having a
different task value. The available time to work on tasks is limited and the available
shooters (servers) are also limited. The question will be how to maximize the expected





Figure 1. Task 1 come first ,Task 2 come after.
A. NO-BDA INFORMATION CASE
In this section, it is assumed that the decoys is launched first and the missile
second. Assume that the decoy and missile have value Vd and Vm and kill rates Xd and X*,
respectively. If the system can correctly identify the sequence the expected return Rn is.
V(Tdm ) = K+K-[Ke-*dt* +Vme-^^\ (Al)
By using r^* the optimal payoff will be :
*.. = v(tJ) = V4 +Vm -\vde^' + Vme^-^] (A2)
If the defender is duped into thinking that the missile comes first then the decoy
comes after, the system will switch tasks afterW and the expected return will be:
*n = V(rj) = Vd + Vn - [*>-* r~<" + Vme-^~^\ (A3)
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B. WITH BDA INFORMATION AFTER MIN(Td , xdm )
In this section it is assumed the decoy is launched first and the missile second. The
policy is to switch to Task 2 (missile) after min(Td ,Tdm)- The expected reward value can be
obtained by conditioning on Td = td
y(^td ) = Vd+Vm(\-e-^^) td <tu
= Vd + Vm{\
-
e-W*>) t„ <td < rdm < tn (A4)
= Vm(l-e-^-^) tn <Tdm <td
Removing the condition, the expected payoff Rn will be:





If the defender is duped into thinking Task 1 (decoy) is Task 2(missile) then he would
switch task after min(Td , xmd * ) We can condition on Td then the expected payoff R2 i
would be:
v(Tjitd ) = rd +Vm{l-e-^^) t d <t lx
= Vd +Vm (}-e-*-
{t*-t< )
) tu <td <Tmd ' <tn
= Fw(l_ e
-^»—
')) tn <Tj <t d
(A6)
Removing the condition:
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Figure 2. Task 2 comes first;Taskl comes after
C. NO-BDA INFORMATION CASE
In this section, it is assumed that the missile is launched first and then the decoy.
Assume that the decoy and missile have values Vd and Vm and kill rates Xd and A™
respectively. If the defender correctly identifies the sequence the expected return R22 is
(A8)
*b =v{Tj) = Vd + Vm -[vme^' +>> ^ r->] (A9)
If the defender is duped into thinking Task 2(decoy) is Task 1 (missile) then he will use
r,„* , in this case:
'dm '
Ve*"T* + F>~M'n_r* (A10)
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D. WITH BDA INFORMATION AFTER MIN(Tm , xmd )
In this section, it is assumed that the missile is launched first and then the decoy.
Suppose that the defender switch to Task 2 after min(Tm , xmd ) The expected reward
value can be obtained by conditioning on Tm = tm :
V{rmdJm ) = Vm +Vd{\-e-^-^) tm <tu





Removing the condition then the expected payoff R22 will be:





If the defender is duped into thinking Taskl (missile) is Task2 (decoy) the defender would
use min^r^r^ j in this case:
v(rJ;tm) = Vm +VAl-e-*,u
-tu)
) tm <tu
= Vm+ Vd(\-e-^-^) t xx <t m <zj<tu
= VJ(\-e^-^' ) ) tu <rj<l m
(A13)
Removing the condition the expected payoff R12 will be:
+ (\- e x««»
- T*
m)
)e *» r* +(e *"'" -e'**** ) (A14)
_£ V.i£-Vi2 '11) ™ \\- e <^ ^Hr*,* f„)l 1
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